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Abstract		
We	review	a	recent	shift	in	conceptions	of	interoception	and	its	relationship	to	hierarchical	inference	
in	 the	 brain.	 	 The	 notion	 of	 interoceptive	 inference	 means	 that	 bodily	 states	 are	 regulated	 by	
autonomic	reflexes	that	are	enslaved	by	descending	predictions	from	deep	generative	models	of	our	
internal	 and	 external	milieu.	 	 This	 re-conceptualization	 illuminates	 several	 issues	 in	 cognitive	 and	
clinical	 neuroscience	 with	 implications	 for	 experiences	 of	 selfhood,	 and	 emotion.	 	 We	 first	
contextualize	 interoception	 in	 terms	 of	 active	 (Bayesian)	 inference	 in	 the	 brain;	 highlighting	 its	
enactivist	(embodied)	aspects.	 	We	then	consider	the	key	role	of	uncertainty	or	precision	and	how	
this	might	translate	into	neuromodulation.		We	next	examine	the	implications	for	understanding	the	
functional	 anatomy	 of	 the	 emotional	 brain,	 surveying	 recent	 observations	 on	 agranular	 cortex.		
Finally,	 we	 turn	 to	 theoretical	 issues;	 namely,	 the	 role	 of	 interoception	 in	 shaping	 a	 sense	 of	
embodied	 self	 and	 feelings.	 	We	will	 draw	 links	between	physiological	 homeostasis	 and	allostasis,	
early	 cybernetic	 ideas	 of	 predictive	 control,	 and	 hierarchical	 generative	 models	 in	 predictive	
processing.	 The	 explanatory	 scope	of	 interoceptive	 inference	 ranges	 from	explanations	 for	 autism	
and	depression,	through	to	consciousness.		We	offer	a	brief	survey	of	these	exciting	developments.	
Keywords:	 emotion;	 self;	 interoception;	 Bayesian;	 predictive	 coding;	 precision;	 neuromodulation;	
depression;	fatigue;	autism;	cybernetics;	active	inference.	
	
	
	 	
Interoceptive	inference	
	
2	
	
Introduction	
Recent	 years	 have	 seen	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 framework	within	 cognitive	 neuroscience	 that	 offers	
exactly	the	right	set	of	concepts	to	talk	about	the	body	and	mind	in	terms	of	beliefs	about	the	body	
(and	 oneself).	 On	 this	 view,	 the	 brain	 is	 not	 an	 elaborate	 stimulus-response	 link	 but	 a	 statistical	
organ	that	actively	generates	explanations	for	the	stimuli	it	encounters	–	in	terms	of	hypotheses	that	
are	 tested	 against	 sensory	 evidence.	 This	 perspective	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 Helmholtzian	
formulations	 of	 unconscious	 inference	 (1).	 Over	 the	 last	 years,	 the	 underlying	 idea	 has	 been	
formalised	 to	 cover	 deep	 or	 hierarchical	 Bayesian	 inference	 –	 about	 the	 hidden	 causes	 of	 our	
sensations	 –	 and	 how	 these	 inferences	 induce	 beliefs	 and	 behaviour	 (2-6).	 	 	 ‘Explanations’,	
‘hypotheses’	 and	 ‘beliefs’	 should	 in	 this	 context	 be	 understood	 not	 as	 consciously	 held	 mental	
states,	 but	 as	 neuronally	 encoded	 probability	 distributions	 (i.e.,	 Bayesian	 beliefs)	 over	 the	 hidden	
causes	 of	 sensory	 signals.	 The	 biophysical	 encoding	 of	 these	 ‘beliefs’	 is,	 technically,	 in	 terms	 of	
sufficient	statistics	like	the	mean	or	expectation	of	a	distribution.		
	
Figure	 1:	 Inference	 and	 perception	 across	 different	 modalities.	 Green	 arrows	 represent	 exteroceptive	
predictions	 and	 prediction	 errors	 underlying	 perception	 of	 the	 external	 world.	 Orange	 arrows	 represent	
proprioceptive	 predictions	 (and	 prediction	 errors)	 generating	 action	 through	 active	 inference.	 Blue	 arrows	
represent	 interoceptive	 predictions	 (and	 prediction	 errors)	 underlying	 emotional	 processing	 and	 autonomic	
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regulation.	 	 Integrated	experiences	of	embodied	selfhood	emerge	from	the	joint	hierarchical	content	of	self-
related	 predictions	 across	 all	 these	 dimensions,	 including	 –	 at	 hierarchically	 deep	 levels	 –	 multimodal	 and	
amodal	predictions.		Adapted	from	(7).		
In	 the	 last	 few	years,	 ‘Bayesian	brain’	 ideas	have	been	applied	 in	the	context	of	 interoception	 (see	
Figure	 1),	 which	 refers	 to	 the	 perception	 and	 integration	 of	 autonomic,	 hormonal,	 visceral	 and	
immunological	signals	(8,	9)	–	or	more	informally	as	the	sense	of	the	body	‘from	within’.		On	some	of	
these	views	(7,	10),	emotional	experience	and	experiences	of	embodied	selfhood	emerge	from	top-
down	 inference	 on	 the	 (multimodal)	 causes	 of	 interoceptive	 afferents,	 generalizing	 so-called	 two-
factor	or	evaluative	theories	of	emotion	and	cognition	(11).		A	first	implication	of	these	proposals	is	
that	 these	 kinds	 of	 perceptual	 experience	 are	 as	 subject	 to	 (implicit	 and	 perhaps	 idiosyncratic)	
beliefs,	 as	 are	perceptions	of	 the	 external	world.	Beyond	 this,	 the	 context	 of	 interoception	brings	
about	further	shifts	 in	how	to	think	about	the	relations	between	body,	mind,	and	brain.	 	One	such	
shift	 is	 that	 generative	 models	 of	 interoceptive	 signals	 should	 be	 geared	 towards	 control	 or	
regulation	 of	 physiological	 variables,	 rather	 than	 towards	 accurate	 representation	 of	 some	 extra-
cranial	 state-of-affairs	 (7,	12)	 (13).	The	two	goals	 remain	 tightly	 interwoven,	 inasmuch	as	effective	
regulation	depends	on	deployment	of	sufficiently	elaborated	predictive	models.	This	shift	recognizes	
alternative	 origins	 to	 ‘Bayesian	 brain’	 ideas	 in	 20th	 Century	 ‘cybernetics’	 (14,	 15)	 and	 in	 doing	 so,	
points	 to	a	deep	connection	between	 life	 and	mind,	 in	which	 cognitive	processes	are	grounded	 in	
fundamental	 evolutionary	 imperatives	 to	 maintain	 physiological	 homeostasis	 (7,	 16).	 Many	 other	
specific	implications	follow,	for	example	in	reframing	the	functional	basis	of	a	variety	of	disorders	of	
emotion	and	selfhood.				
Here,	 we	 survey	 these	 exciting	 developments.	 	 We	 first	 provide	 a	 brief	 introduction	 to	 the	
framework	 of	 prediction	 error	 minimization	 in	 the	 Bayesian	 brain,	 emphasizing	 its	 embodied	 or	
enactive	aspects.	These	aspects	appear	prominently	in	the	role	of	action	in	reducing	prediction	error	
(i.e.,	active	inference)	and	emphasise	the	key	role	of	uncertainty	or	precision	in	shaping	the	interplay	
between	prior	beliefs	and	 sensory	evidence.	 	Precision-weighting	of	 recurrent	 signalling	 in	 cortical	
hierarchies	 is	 closely	 associated	 with	 neuromodulation,	 providing	 important	 clues	 about	
developmental	origins	of	conditions	like	autism;	it	is	also	associated	with	attention,	suggesting	novel	
accounts	for	symptom	expression	due	to	aberrant	attention	to	interoceptive	signals.	
Turning	 to	 functional	 neuroanatomy,	 we	 outline	 the	 functional	 architecture	 of	 interoceptive	
inference	 and	 review	 recent	 suggestions	 that	 perceptual	 predictions	 originate	 preferentially	 in	
agranular	 cortices	 (9)	 (17)	 while	 acknowledging	 that	 direct	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 interoceptive	
inference	 is	 still	 to	 be	 uncovered.	 	 	 We	 next	 address	 some	 theoretical	 issues,	 relating	 active	
interoceptive	 inference	 to	 experiences	 of	 emotion	 and	 embodied	 selfhood,	 highlighting	 a	 control-
oriented	or	instrumental	perspective	on	interoceptive	inference	that	calls	on	cybernetic	concepts	of	
predictive	regulation,	allostatic	control	and	perceptual	control	theory	(7,	13)	(18).	 	We	conclude	by	
exploring	 the	 implications	 of	 these	 ideas	 for	 a	 sample	 of	 clinical	 conditions	 that	may	 reflect	 false	
interoceptive	inference;	either	in	their	aetiology	and/or	in	symptom	expression.		While	disorders	in	
emotional	 processing	 and	 interoceptive	 experience	 naturally	 invite	 explanations	 in	 terms	 of	
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abnormal	 interoceptive	 inference,	 we	 also	 highlight	 how	 this	 perspective	 can	 illuminate	 other	
conditions	and	symptoms	including	autism,	fatigue,	and	depression.	
Predictive	coding	in	the	Bayesian	brain	
Current	 formulations	 of	 Helmholtz’s	 notion	 are	 now	 the	 most	 popular	 metaphors	 for	 neuronal	
processing	and	are	usually	considered	under	the	Bayesian	brain	hypothesis	as	predictive	coding	(6,	
19-21).	 Predictive	 coding	 is	 a	 process	 theory	 with	 a	 biologically	 plausible	 back	 story	 –	 and	 a	
considerable	amount	of	empirical	support	 (21,	22).	See	(23)	for	a	review	of	canonical	microcircuits	
and	predictive	coding	 in	perception	(24,	25)	for	an	application	of	the	same	ideas	to	motor	control,	
and	(26)	for	evidence	of	feedforward	and	feedback	signalling	carried	by	distinct	frequency	bands.	
In	 these	 schemes,	 neuronal	 representations	 in	 higher	 or	 deeper	 levels	 of	 neuronal	 hierarchies	
generate	predictions	of	representations	in	lower	levels.	These	descending	predictions	are	compared	
with	 lower-level	 representations	 to	 form	a	prediction	error	 (usually	associated	with	 the	activity	of	
superficial	 pyramidal	 cells).	 This	mismatch	or	difference	 signal	 is	 passed	back	up	 the	hierarchy,	 to	
update	 higher	 representations	 (usually	 associated	 with	 the	 activity	 of	 deep	 pyramidal	 cells).	 The	
recurrent	exchange	of	 signals	between	adjacent	hierarchal	 levels	 resolves	prediction	error	at	each	
and	every	 level,	 resulting	 in	a	hierarchically	deep	explanation	 for	 sensory	 inputs.	 In	computational	
terms,	 the	 activity	 of	 neuronal	 populations	 is	 assumed	 to	 encode	 Bayesian	 beliefs	 or	 probability	
distributions	over	states	in	the	world	that	cause	sensations	(e.g.,	my	visual	sensations	are	caused	by	
a	face	–	see	Figures	2	and	3).	The	simplest	encoding	corresponds	to	representing	the	belief	with	the	
expected	value	 (mean)	of	a	 (hidden)	 cause	or	expectation.	 These	causes	are	 referred	 to	as	hidden	
because	they	have	to	be	inferred	from	their	sensory	consequences.	In	other	words,	they	can	never	
be	directly	observed	and	are	forever	hidden	behind	a	sensory	veil.	
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Figure	2:	This	 figure	summarizes	 the	hierarchical	neuronal	message	passing	that	underlies	predictive	coding.	
The	basic	idea	is	that	neuronal	activity	encodes	expectations	about	the	causes	of	sensory	input,	where	these	
expectations	minimize	prediction	error.	Prediction	error	 is	 the	difference	between	 (ascending)	sensory	 input	
and	 (descending)	 predictions	 of	 that	 input.	 This	 minimization	 rests	 upon	 recurrent	 neuronal	 interactions	
between	different	 levels	 of	 the	 cortical	 hierarchy.	Current	 interpretations	 suggest	 that	 superficial	 pyramidal	
cells	(red	triangles)	compare	the	expectations	(at	each	level)	with	top-down	predictions	from	deep	pyramidal	
cells	(black	triangles)	of	higher	levels	(22,	23).	Left	panel:	this	schematic	shows	a	simple	cortical	hierarchy	with	
ascending	prediction	errors	and	descending	predictions.	This	graphic	includes	neuromodulatory	gating	or	gain	
control	 (blue)	 of	 superficial	 pyramidal	 cells	 that	 determines	 their	 relative	 influence	 on	 deep	 pyramidal	 cells	
encoding	expectations	through	modulation	of	expected	precision	(see	below	and	text	for	details).	Right	panel:	
this	provides	a	 schematic	example	 in	 the	visual	 system:	 it	 shows	 the	putative	cells	of	origin	of	ascending	or	
forward	 connections	 that	 convey	 prediction	 errors	 (red	 arrows)	 and	 descending	 or	 backward	 connections	
(black	arrows)	that	construct	predictions.	The	prediction	errors	are	weighted	by	their	expected	precision	that	
we	have	associated	with	the	activity	of	neuromodulatory	systems	–	here	projections	from	ventral	tegmental	
area	(VTA)	and	substantia	nigra	(SN).	In	this	example,	the	frontal	eye	fields	send	predictions	to	primary	visual	
cortex,	 which	 it	 projects	 to	 the	 lateral	 geniculate	 body.	 However,	 the	 frontal	 eye	 fields	 also	 send	
proprioceptive	predictions	to	pontine	nuclei,	which	are	passed	to	the	oculomotor	system	to	cause	movement	
through	classical	 reflexes.	These	descending	predictions	are	also	passed	to	the	 lateral	geniculate	body	–	and	
constitute	corollary	discharge.	Every	top-down	prediction	is	reciprocated	with	a	bottom-up	prediction	error	to	
ensure	predictions	are	constrained	by	sensory	information.	The	resolution	of	proprioceptive	prediction	error	is	
particularly	 important	because	this	enables	descending	predictions	–	about	the	state	of	 the	body	–	to	cause	
movement	 by	 dynamically	 resetting	 the	 equilibrium	 or	 set-point	 of	 classical	 reflexes.	 	 Resolving	 sensory	
prediction	errors	through	action	is	known	as	active	inference	(see	text).	Adapted	from	(27).	
In	short,	predictive	coding	represents	a	biologically	plausible	scheme	for	updating	beliefs	about	the	
world	based	on	sensory	samples	(Figure	2).	In	this	setting,	neuroanatomy	and	neurophysiology	can	
the	regarded	as	a	distillation	of	statistical	or	causal	structure	in	the	environment	that	is	disclosed	by	
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sensory	 samples.	 The	 resulting	 anatomy	 of	 connections	 and	 their	 physiology	 furnish	 a	 generative	
model	 –	 generating	 predictions	 of	 sensations	 that	 can	 be	 compared	with	 actual	 sensory	 samples.	
Empirical	 evidence	 is	 now	 emerging	 that	 shows	 how	 prior	 expectations	 shape	 behavioural	 and	
neuronal	signatures	of	perception,	with	recent	studies	in	vision	(28-30)	and	audition	(31)	providing	
excellent	examples.	More	generally,	this	view	of	perception	emphasises	‘the	beholder's	share’.	See	
also	Figure	3:	
"The	insight	that	the	beholder's	perception	involves	a	top-down	inference	convinced	[the	art	historian	
Ernst]	Gombrich	that	there	is	no	"innocent	eye":	that	is,	all	visual	perception	is	based	on	classifying	
concepts	and	 interpreting	visual	 information.	One	cannot	perceive	 that	which	one	cannot	classify."	
(32)	
	
Figure	 3:	 A.	 Giuseppe	 Arcimboldo,	 The	 Vegetable	 Gardener	 (c.1590).	 Oil	 on	 panel.	 Our	 percepts	 are	
constrained	by	what	we	expect	 to	see	and	 the	hypotheses	 that	can	be	called	upon	 to	explain	sensory	 input	
(33).	 Arcimboldo,	 "a	 16th	 century	 Milanese	 artist	 who	 was	 a	 favourite	 of	 the	 Viennese,	 illustrates	 this	
dramatically	 by	 using	 fruits	 and	 vegetables	 to	 create	 faces	 in	 his	 paintings.	When	 viewed	 right	 side	 up,	 the	
paintings	 are	 readily	 recognisable	 faces."	 (32).	 Adapted	 from	 (27).	 B.	 Faces	 are	 probably	 one	 of	 the	 most	
important	(hidden)	causes	of	our	sensations.	While	in	Arcimboldo’s	image,	viewing	right	side	up	is	needed	for	
the	configuration	of	 features	 to	appear	as	a	 face,	when	 images	are	already	recognisably	 faces,	viewing	right	
side	up	(by	rotating	the	page)	reveals	that	these	faces	might	in	fact	be	more	different	than	they	appear	(this	is	
A"
B"
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the	so-called	“Thatcher	illusion”).	These	examples	illustrate	the	complex	interplay	between	prior	expectations	
and	stimulus	features	that	shape	perceptual	content	[image	adapted	from	(34)].		
Embodied	(active)	inference	and	precision-weighting	
There	 are	 two	 key	 ways	 in	 which	 prediction	 errors	 can	 be	 reduced:	 The	 first	 is	 by	 updating	
predictions	 to	make	 them	more	 like	 the	expectations	 at	 lower	 levels	 (and	 sensations)	 currently	 in	
play.	This	process	corresponds	to	perception,	as	implemented	in	predictive	coding.		The	second	way	
to	resolve	prediction	errors	 is	 to	change	the	sensory	samples	to	make	them	more	 like	predictions.	
This	entails	an	active	sampling	of	the	sensorium	through	a	redeployment	of	sensory	surfaces;	e.g.,	
saccadic	 eye	 searches	 or	 other	 sensory	 palpitations.	 Placing	 predictive	 coding	 in	 an	 embodied	 or	
enactive	 framework,	 in	which	both	action	and	perception	are	 in	 the	game	of	minimising	 the	same	
prediction	error	 is	known	as	active	 inference	 (35).	To	fully	appreciate	the	bilateral	nature	of	active	
inference,	one	has	to	consider	the	embodied	context	 in	which	predictions	are	made	(and	fulfilled).	
These	predictions	are	not	only	about	the	world,	but	also	about	the	body.	In	brief,	perception	can	be	
understood	as	resolving	(exteroceptive)	prediction	errors	by	selecting	predictions	that	best	explain	
sensations,	 while	 behaviour	 suppresses	 (proprioceptive)	 prediction	 error	 by	 changing	
(proprioceptive)	 sensations.	 This	 suppression	 rests	 on	 classical	 reflexes,	 whose	 equilibrium	 points	
are	set	by	descending	proprioceptive	predictions	(24).	For	example,	an	intended	movement	can	be	
elicited	by	simply	predicting	the	proprioceptive	consequences	of	a	particular	movement	trajectory,	
which	 will	 be	 fulfilled	 by	 peripheral	 reflexes.	 Note	 that	 only	 proprioceptive	 prediction	 errors	 are	
minimised	 (at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 spinal	 cord);	 however,	 with	 a	 good	 generative	 model,	 these	
movements	 will	 also	 fulfil	 visual	 and	 other	 exteroceptive	 (e.g.,	 somatosensory)	 predictions.	 This	
follows	because	descending	 (multimodal)	predictions	emanate	 from	a	deep	generative	model	 that	
effectively	assimilates	prediction	errors	from	all	modalities	–	including	interoception.	In	this	context,	
an	important	and	sometimes	overlooked	aspect	of	active	inference	is	that	it	implies	a	counterfactual	
or	conditional	aspect.	That	is,	in	order	for	an	action	successfully	to	reduce	prediction	error,	the	brain	
must	 represent	 not	 only	 the	 hidden	 causes	 of	 current	 sensory	 signals	 but	 also	 must	 use	 these	
representations	 to	 predict	 how	 sensory	 signals	 would	 change	 under	 specific	 actions	 (36).		
Interestingly,	 it	has	been	suggested	 that	 such	counterfactual	aspects	of	perceptual	prediction	may	
underlie	basic	properties	perceptual	experience,	such	as	‘presence’	or	‘objecthood’	(37).	
To	 enable	 predictions	 about	 the	 consequences	 of	 action	 to	 be	 fulfilled,	 we	 have	 to	 attenuate	
proprioceptive	prediction	errors	–	 that	would	otherwise	deliver	unequivocal	 evidence	 that	we	are	
not,	 in	 fact,	 acting.	 This	 attenuation	 rests	 on	 reducing	 the	 precision	 of	 proprioceptive	 prediction	
errors.	 Precision	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	measure	 of	 signal-to-noise	 or	 confidence.	Mathematically,	
precision	 is	 the	 inverse	 variance	 or	 reliability	 of	 a	 signal.	 Estimating	 precision	 speaks	 to	 a	
fundamental	aspect	of	inference;	namely,	the	encoding	of	precision	or	expected	uncertainty	(38-40).	
In	other	words,	we	have	to	infer	both	the	cause	of	our	sensations	and	the	context,	 in	terms	of	the	
(expected	 or	 subjective)	 precision	 of	 sensory	 evidence.	 This	 represents	 a	 subtle	 but	 ubiquitous	
problem	 for	 the	brain,	where	 the	solution	 rests	on	modulating	 the	gain	or	excitability	of	neuronal	
populations	reporting	prediction	error	(21,	41,	42).	
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Heuristically,	 one	 can	 regard	 ascending	 prediction	 errors	 in	 cortical	 hierarchies	 as	 broadcasting	
‘newsworthy’	 information	that	cannot	be	explained	by	descending	predictions.	However,	the	brain	
also	has	to	select	the	prediction	errors	it	attends	to.	It	can	do	this	by	adjusting	their	volume	or	gain.	
Those	prediction	errors	that	have	been	assigned	high	precision	therefore	have	privileged	access	to	
high	 levels	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 and	 can	 therefore	 update	 high-level	 expectations.	 Empirical	 evidence	
suggests	that	this	precision-weighting	is	a	generic	computational	process	throughout	the	brain	(40)	
and	may	be	 instantiated	 through	neuromodulatory	mechanisms	of	gain	 control	 at	a	 synaptic	 level	
(43).	 The	 ensuing	 neuromodulatory	 gain	 control	 corresponds	 to	 a	 (Bayes-optimal)	 encoding	 of	
precision	 in	 terms	of	 the	excitability	of	neuronal	populations	 reporting	prediction	errors.	This	may	
explain	 why	 superficial	 pyramidal	 cells	 are	 equipped	 with	 so	 many	 synaptic	 gain	 control	
mechanisms;	 such	 as	NMDA	 receptors	 and	 classical	 neuromodulatory	 receptors	 like	D1	dopamine	
receptors	 (44-47).	 Furthermore,	 it	 places	 excitation-inhibition	 balance	 in	 a	 perfect	 position	 to	
mediate	Bayesian	belief	updating	within	and	among	hierarchical	levels	(48).	This	contextual	aspect	of	
predictive	 coding	has	 been	 associated	with	 attentional	 gain	 control	 in	 sensory	processing	 (41,	 49)	
and	has	been	discussed	in	terms	of	affordance	in	the	setting	of	action	selection	(50-52).	Crucially,	the	
delicate	balance	of	precision	over	hierarchical	levels	can	have	a	profound	effect	on	inference	–	and	
may	underlie	false	beliefs	in	psychopathology	(53).	
Interoceptive	inference	
Key	 challenges	 for	 formal	 accounts	 of	 brain	 function	 are	 emotion,	 self-awareness	 and	 their	
disorders.	Recently,	people	have	started	to	cast	emotional	processing	in	terms	of	predictive	coding	
or	 inference	 about	 interoceptive	 or	 bodily	 states	 (54,	 55)	 (9,	 56).	 The	 basic	 argument	 follows	 the	
explanation	for	action	above;	namely,	motor	reflexes	are	driven	by	proprioceptive	prediction	errors.	
Proprioceptive	 prediction	 errors	 compare	 primary	 afferents	 from	 stretch	 receptors	 with	
proprioceptive	predictions	that	descend	to	alpha	motor	neurons	in	the	spinal-cord	and	cranial	nerve	
nuclei.	This	effectively	replaces	descending	motor	commands	with	proprioceptive	predictions,	which	
are	fulfilled	by	peripheral	reflexes	(24).	These	predictions	rest	on	deep	hierarchical	inference	about	
states	 of	 the	 world,	 including	 our	 own	 body.	 Replacing	 proprioceptive	 signals	 with	 interoceptive	
signals,	 one	 can	 see	 how	 autonomic	 reflexes	 can	 transcribe	 descending	 interoceptive	 predictions	
into	 physiological	 homoeostasis	 (e.g.,	 blood	 pressure,	 glycaemia,	 etc.).	 Importantly,	 interoceptive	
predictions	constitute	just	one	stream	of	multimodal	predictions	that	are	generated	by	expectations	
about	the	embodied	self.	On	this	view,	interoceptive	signals	do	not	cause	emotional	awareness,	or	
vice	versa.	Instead,	there	is	a	circular	causality,	where	neuronally	encoded	predictions	about	bodily	
states	engage	autonomic	reflexes	through	active	 inference	(see	below),	while	 interoceptive	signals	
inform	and	update	these	predictions.	Emotion	or	affective	content	then	becomes	an	attribute	of	any	
representation	 that	 generates	 interoceptive	 predictions	 –	 where	 interoception	 is	 necessarily	
contextualised	by	concurrent	exteroceptive	and	proprioceptive	cues	(see	Figure	1).	
A	 useful	way	 to	 think	 about	 interoceptive	 inference	 is	 as	 generalizing	 physiological	 (James-Lange)	
and	two-factor	or	appraisal	(e.g.,	(11))	approaches	to	emotion.	These	formulations	regard	emotional	
experience	 as	 arising	 from	 cognitively	 contextualized	 perception	 of	 changes	 in	 bodily	 state.	
Interoceptive	 inference	 extends	 these	 early	 ideas	 to	 incorporate	 a	 smooth	 hierarchy	 of	 (precision	
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weighted)	predictions	and	prediction	errors,	without	assuming	any	bright	 line	distinction	between	
cognitive	 and	 non-cognitive	 processing.	 	 By	 analogy	 with	 predictive	 coding	 approaches	 to	 visual	
perception,	we	propose	that	emotional	content	is	determined	by	beliefs	(i.e.,	posterior	expectations)	
about	the	causes	of	interoceptive	signals	across	multiple	hierarchical	levels.		An	important	challenge	
in	 this	context	 to	 is	 to	 identify	which	aspects	of	 inference	support	specifically	conscious	emotional	
experience,	 with	 predictions	 (rather	 than	 prediction	 errors)	 being	 the	 preferred	 vehicle	 (30).	 It	 is	
tempting	 to	 speculate	 that	 deep	 expectations	 at	 higher	 levels	 of	 the	 neuronal	 hierarchy	 are	
candidates	 for	 –	 or	 correlates	 of	 –	 conscious	 experience;	 largely	 because	 their	 predictions	 are	
domain	general	and	can	therefore	be	articulated	(through	autonomic	or	motor	reflexes).	
Crucially,	 interoceptive	inference	augments	appraisal	theories	with	the	concept	of	active	inference,	
by	 which	 interoceptive	 predictions	 can	 perform	 physiological	 homeostasis	 by	 enlisting	 autonomic	
reflexes	(10,	13)	More	specifically,	descending	predictions	provide	a	homoeostatic	set	point	against	
which	primary	(interoceptive)	afferents	can	be	compared.	The	resulting	prediction	error	then	drives	
sympathetic	or	parasympathetic	effector	systems	to	ensure	homoeostasis	or	allostasis;	for	example,	
sympathetic	 smooth-muscle	 vasodilatation	 as	 a	 reflexive	 response	 to	 the	 predicted	 interoceptive	
consequences	 of	 ‘blushing	 with	 embarrassment’.	 This	 formulation	 of	 autonomic	 reflexes	 follows	
exactly	 the	 active	 inference	 formulation	 of	motor	 reflexes	 that	 enable	 the	 contraction	 of	 striated	
muscle	 to	be	prescribed	or	 enslaved	by	 equilibrium	points	 set	 by	descending	projections	 to	 alpha	
motoneurons	in	the	spinal-cord	(57).	
Active	inference	highlights	a	shift	from	predictive	models	underlying	perception	of	hidden	causes	of	
sensory	data,	to	their	use	in	control	or	regulation	of	these	causes	(7).		Importantly,	both	(predictive)	
perception	and	(predictive)	regulation	can	involve	action,	as	emphasized	by	distinguishing	epistemic	
and	instrumental	active	inference	(7,	12).		The	basic	idea	is	that	epistemic	(active)	inference	involves	
selecting	actions	that	we	expect	to	increase	the	fit	between	predictive	models	and	hidden	causes	of	
sensory	signals.	This	form	of	inference	may	characterise,	for	example,	saccadic	eye	movements	(36)	
or	 exploratory	 body	 movements	 to	 inform	 self-models	 (58).	 	 Instrumental	 active	 inference,	 by	
contrast,	 leverages	predictive	models	to	achieve	control	of	sensory	variables.	 	This	perspective	has	
been	applied	to	exteroception	in	the	guise	of	‘perceptual	control	theory’	(18)	which	emphasized	that	
“control	systems	control	what	they	sense,	not	what	they	do”	(italics	in	the	original).	Instrumental	or	
control-oriented	inference	is	however	particularly	relevant	to	interoception,	where	maintenance	of	
physiological	 variables	within	homeostatically	 viable	 ranges	 is	 critical	 to	organism	 survival.	 	 In	 this	
context,	exploratory	or	epistemic	 interoceptive	 ‘actions’	may	be	 less	evident	because	they	may	be	
more	costly:	one	does	not	want	to	raise	one’s	blood	pressure	to	physiologically	dangerous	levels	just	
to	see	whether	it	can	return.		The	association	of	predictive	models	with	control	of	sensory	variables	
recalls	the	cybernetic	view	that	‘every	good	regulator	of	a	system	must	be	a	model	of	that	system’	
(14),	 and	 the	 distinction	 between	 instrumental	 and	 epistemic	 actions	 also	 highlights	 the	
counterfactual	 aspects	of	 active	 inference,	where	potential	 actions	are	associated	with	 their	 likely	
sensory	consequences	(7)	(37)	(36).	
In	 terms	of	predictive	 coding,	 the	balance	between	homoeostatic	 reflexes	and	more	goal-directed	
allostatic	behaviour	rests	upon	the	confidence	(i.e.,	precision),	placed	in	deeper	expectations	about	
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how	we	will	behave.	For	example,	hypoglycaemia	could	 induce	 low-level	predictions	 that	mobilise	
glucose	 stores	 (through	 autonomic	 reflexes	 driven	 by	 precise	 interoceptive	 prediction	 errors).	
Alternatively,	 if	 we	 can	 attenuate	 the	 precision	 of	 low-level	 interoception,	 then	 proprioceptive	
predictions	 can	 be	 fulfilled	 that	 preclude	 domain	 specific	 homoeostatic	 responses	 –	 and	 engage	
allostatic	behaviour;	i.e.,	preparing	and	consuming	a	meal.	
As	yet,	direct	empirical	evidence	for	(or	against)	interoceptive	predictions	or	prediction	errors	is	still	
lacking.	 	While	 there	 is	ample	circumstantial	 that	 fits	comfortably	with	 this	 framework	 [see	 (9,	10,	
56,	 59)	 for	 reviews],	 the	 principles	 of	 interoceptive	 inference	 rest	 primarily	 on	 the	 view	 that	
perceptual	inference	–	whether	about	the	world	or	about	the	body	–	is	likely	to	involve	a	common	
computational	architecture.		Moreover,	the	neuroanatomical	properties	of	brain	regions	involved	in	
interoceptive	processing	can	be	informatively	interpreted	from	this	perspective,	as	we	describe	next.	
Functional	neuroanatomy	of	interoceptive	inference	
Translating	the	computational	machinery	of	interoceptive	inference	into	a	deeper	understanding	of	
brain	 function	 requires	mapping	 its	 computational	 elements	 onto	 neuroanatomical	 substrates.	 	 A	
number	of	recent	proposals	suggest	several	convergent	features	(9,	10,	13).	The	first	is	that	so-called	
visceromotor	areas	(VMAs),	such	as	the	anterior	insula	cortex	(AIC),	anterior	cingulate	cortex	(ACC),	
subgenual	 cortex	 (SGC),	 and	perhaps	 also	 orbitofrontal	 cortex	 (OFC)	 are	 situated	 at	 the	 top	of	 an	
interoceptive	hierarchy.	 	The	second	is	that	these	areas	collectively	embody	a	generative	model	of	
interoceptive	responses	and	issue	predictions	that,	when	unpacked	at	the	lowest	hierarchical	level,	
serve	 as	 homeostatic	 set-points.	 These	 visceromotor	 areas	 are	 known	 to	 receive	 ascending	
projections	 from	 viscerosensory	 areas	 (e.g.,	 posterior	 and	 mid-insula)	 and	 their	 descending	
connections	 engage	 a	 range	 of	 subcortical,	 brainstem	 and	 spinal	 cord	 targets	 involved	 in	
visceromotor	control,	such	as	the	periaqueductal	grey	(PAG)	and	the	parabrachial	nucleus	(PBN)	(8,	
60-62).		Visceromotor	efferents	also	directly	innervate	viscerosensory	areas,	potentially	providing	a	
form	of	efference	copy	or	corollary	discharge	(i.e.,	descending	predictions)	enabling	the	formation	of	
(ascending)	interoceptive	prediction	errors.		As	well	as	known	anatomical	connectivity	patterns,	this	
basic	 architecture	 is	 supported	 by	 cytoarchitectonic	 observations	 that	 VMAs	 lack	 a	 well	 formed	
(granular)	layer	IV	as	a	target	for	ascending	prediction	errors	(9).		Such	agranular	cortical	regions	are	
argued	 to	 be	 well	 suited	 to	 the	 issuing	 of	 predictions,	 in	 both	 interoceptive	 (9)	 and	 motor	 (17)	
domains.	 See	 Figure	 4	 for	 a	 schematic	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 functional	 anatomy	 implied	 by	 interoceptive	
inference	(that	we	will	appeal	to	later	in	the	context	of	autism).	
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Figure	 4:	A	 (simplified)	 neural	 architecture	underlying	 the	predictive	 coding	of	 visual,	 somatosensory	 and	
interoceptive	 signals.	 The	 anatomical	 designations,	 although	 plausible,	 are	 used	 to	 simply	 illustrate	 how	
predictive	coding	can	be	mapped	onto	neuronal	systems.	As	in	Figure	2,	red	triangles	correspond	to	neuronal	
populations	(superficial	pyramidal	cells)	encoding	prediction	error,	while	blue	triangles	represent	populations	
(deep	 pyramidal	 cells)	 encoding	 expectations.	 These	 provide	 descending	 predictions	 to	 prediction	 error	
populations	in	lower	hierarchical	levels	(blue	connections).	The	prediction	error	populations	then	reciprocate	
ascending	 prediction	 errors	 to	 adjust	 the	 expectations	 (red	 connections).	 Arrows	 denote	 excitatory	
connections,	 while	 circles	 denote	 inhibitory	 effects	 (mediated	 by	 inhibitory	 interneurons).	 In	 this	 example,	
recurrent	 connections	mediate	 innate	 (epigenetically	 specified)	 reflexes	 –	 such	 as	 the	 suckling	 reflex	 –	 that	
elicit	 autonomic	 (e.g.,	 vasovagal)	 reflexes	 in	 response	 to	 appropriate	 somatosensory	 input.	 These	 reflexes	
depend	 upon	 high-level	 representations	 predicting	 both	 the	 somatosensory	 input	 and	 interoceptive	
consequences.	The	representations	are	activated	by	somatosensory	prediction	errors	and	send	interoceptive	
predictions	 to	 the	 hypothalamic	 area	 –	 to	 elicit	 interoceptive	 prediction	 errors	 that	 are	 resolved	 in	 the	
periphery	 by	 autonomic	 reflexes.	 Oxytocin	 (in	 green)	 is	 shown	 to	 project	 to	 the	 hypothalamic	 area,	 to	
modulate	 the	gain	or	precision	of	 interoceptive	prediction	error	units.	One	hypothesis	 for	autism	rests	on	a	
failure	to	attenuate	the	precision	of	autonomic	prediction	errors,	thereby	precluding	expectations	about	visual	
and	 somatosensory	 information	 (e.g.,	 a	 mother’s	 face	 or	 affiliative	 touch)	 that	 is	 not	 accompanied	 by	
autonomic	input	(see	text).	FFA;	fusiform	face	area.	AIC:	anterior	insular	cortex.	ACC:	anterior	cingulate	cortex,	
OFC:	orbitofrontal	cortex.	PAG:	periaqueductal	grey.	PBN:	parabrachial	nucleus.	
Autonomic	
input
Somatosensory	
input
Visual	input
(face)
Hypothalamus/PBN
Supraoptic	nucleus/PAG
AIC
Somatosensory	areas
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	Interoceptive	inference	and	embodied	selfhood	
Having	 described	 the	 computational	 architecture	 of	 interoceptive	 inference	 and	 its	 potential	
functional	neuroanatomy,	we	are	now	 in	a	position	 to	explore	how	 this	 framework	can	 illuminate	
more	theoretical	issues	in	the	nature	and	experience	of	selfhood.	In	everyday	life,	we	experience	our	
‘selfhood’	as	continuous	and	integrated.	While	it	may	be	adaptive	to	experience	being	a	‘self’	in	this	
way,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	assume	on	this	basis	that	there	is	such	a	thing	as	unitary	self-process	
underlying	 these	 experiences.	 Clinical	 conditions	 and	 experimental	manipulations	 amply	 illustrate	
that	 experiences	 of	 selfhood	 unfold	 across	 many	 partially	 independent	 and	 partially	 overlapping	
levels	 of	 description;	 levels	 which	 can	 be	 teased	 apart	 in	 the	 laboratory	 or	 which	may	 fall	 apart	
during	psychiatric	or	neurological	 illness.	 	A	 simple	classification,	 from	 ‘low’	 to	 ‘high’	 levels,	would	
range	 from	 experiences	 of	 being	 and	 having	 a	 body	 (10)	 (63)	 (64),	 through	 to	 the	 experience	 of	
perceiving	 the	world	 from	a	 particular	 point	 of	 view	 (a	 first	 person	 perspective,	 see	 (65)	 (66)),	 to	
experiences	 of	 intention	 and	 agency	 (67)	 (68),	 and	 at	 higher	 levels	 the	 experience	 of	 being	 a	
continuous	self	over	time	(a	‘narrative’	self	or	‘I’	that	depends	on	episodic	autobiographical	memory,	
see	(69))	and	finally	a	social	self,	in	which	my	experience	of	being	‘me’	is	shaped	by	how	I	perceive	
others’	 perceptions	 of	 me	 (70).	 	 In	 this	 putative	 classification,	 interoception	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	
structuring	experiences	of	 ‘being	and	having	a	body’	 (i.e.,	embodied	selfhood)	and	may	also	shape	
selfhood	at	other,	hierarchically	higher	levels.	
There	 is	accumulating	evidence	 that	 interoception	plays	a	key	 role	 in	 shaping	experiences	of	body	
ownership.	 	 Illusions	of	body	ownership,	 like	 the	 rubber	hand	 illusion	and	 the	 so-called	 ‘full	body’	
illusion,	while	 normally	 induced	 by	 false	 visuo-tactile	 congruence,	 can	 also	 be	 induced	 by	 ‘cardio-
visual’	feedback	in	which	a	virtual	body	(or	body	part)	flashes	in	time	with	a	participant’s	heartbeat	
(71,	 72).	 	 Recent	 extensions	 of	 these	 studies	 have	 also	 shown	 that	 visual	 feedback	 of	 respiratory	
patterns	can	have	a	similar	effect	(73),	providing	support	for	a	multimodal	influence	of	interoception	
on	 embodied	 selfhood.	 	 The	ways	 in	which	 interoceptive	 predictions	 and	 prediction	 errors	 shape	
‘higher’	 levels	 of	 selfhood	 remain	 exciting	 areas	 for	 investigation	 (74).	 	 As	 discussed	 next,	 much	
current	evidence	in	these	areas	is	found	in	studies	of	abnormal	experiences	of	selfhood.	
Selfhood	and	psychopathology	
Very	 generally,	 the	 (predictive	 coding)	 process	 theory	 that	 we	 have	 sketched	 above	 for	 active	
inference	 speaks	 to	 the	 synaptic	 mechanisms	 that	 might	 underlie	 false	 inference	 in	 psychiatric	
conditions:	 in	 brief,	 the	 formal	 constraints	 implicit	 in	 predictive	 coding	 require	 a	modulatory	 gain	
control	 on	 ascending	 prediction	 errors.	 A	 recent	 paper	 (75)	 exemplifies	 how	 one	 can	 understand	
functional	 (hysterical)	 symptoms	 as	 false	 inference	 about	 the	 causes	 of	 abnormal	 sensations,	
movements	 or	 their	 absence.	 This	 example	 offers	 a	 simple	 (neurophysiological)	 explanation	 of	
symptomatology	that	is	otherwise	rather	difficult	to	diagnose	or	formulate.	This	theme	is	emerging	
repeatedly	 in	 psychiatry:	 from	 false	 inference	 as	 an	 account	 of	 positive	 symptoms	 (hallucinations	
and	delusions)	in	schizophrenia	(76),	to	the	loss	of	central	coherence	in	autism	(77).	Moreover,	it	is	
remarkable	 that	 the	same	role	 for	precision-weighting	of	prediction	errors	emerges	 from	different	
theoretical	treatments	of	 learning	and	inference	in	the	brain	–	 including	predictive	coding	in	vision	
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(20),	 free-energy	 accounts	 of	 perception	 and	 behaviour	 (4)	 and	 hierarchical	 Bayesian	 models	 of	
learning	(78).	
Autism	and	interoceptive	inference	
Perhaps	 the	 best	 example	 of	 applying	 concepts	 from	 interoceptive	 inference	 to	 understanding	
disorders	 of	 selfhood	 can	 be	 found	 in	 autism	 research.	 Recently,	much	 of	 the	 phenomenology	 of	
autism	has	been	cast	in	terms	of	false	inference	that	results	from	a	loss	of	prior	precision,	relative	to	
sensory	precision	(77,	79,	80).	However,	 in	autism	the	consequences	of	increases	in	(or	a	failure	to	
attenuate)	 sensory	precision	are	also	being	considered	 in	a	developmental	context	–	 in	which	one	
has	to	accommodate	the	consequences	for	acquisition	or	learning	of	deep	generative	models.	This	is	
particularly	interesting	in	relation	to	interoceptive	inference	because	it	touches	on	the	acquisition	of	
generative	models	that	distinguish	between	self	and	other.		
One	line	of	thinking	here	is	that	a	failure	to	contextualise	interoceptive	cues,	elicited	by	interactions	
with	the	mother,	precludes	a	proper	attribution	of	the	agency	to	the	interoceptive	consequences	of	
prosocial	 interactions	 (18).	 In	 brief,	 the	 idea	 is	 that	 a	 failure	 to	 attenuate	 the	 precision	 of	
interoceptive	 prediction	 errors	 would	 not	 only	 render	 autistic	 infants	 unduly	 sensitive	 to	
interoceptive	 cues	 (i.e.,	 autonomic	 hypersensitivity)	 but	 would	 have	 profound	 implications	 for	 a	
sense	 of	 self	 versus	 other.	 This	 follows	 from	 the	 inability	 to	 ignore	 the	 absence	 of	 interoceptive	
signals	associated	with	nurturing	(e.g.,	breastfeeding)	during	affiliative	 interactions	with	[m]others.	
In	 short,	 the	 autistic	 infant	 could	 never	 learn	 that	 the	 nurturing	 and	 prosocial	 [m]other	were	 the	
same	hidden	cause	or	external	object	(18).	See	Figure	4.		This	has	several	interesting	implications	for	
attachment,	theory	of	mind,	and	a	lack	of	central	coherence	that	characterises	the	disorder	in	later	
life	 (82).	 It	 also	 provides	 an	 interesting	 explanation	 for	 interoceptive	 hypersensitivity	 (c.f.,	 an	
emotional	echopraxia)	in	autism	and	failure	to	engage	with	prosocial	(exteroceptive)	cues	(83).	If	this	
explanation	 is	 right,	 then	 it	 provides	a	 clear	pointer	 to	 abnormalities	of	 (precision)	 gain	 control	 in	
cortical	systems	mediating	interoceptive	inference	such	as	the	anterior	insular	and	cingulate	cortex	
(84,	85).		
Potential	 interoceptive	 abnormalities	 in	 autism	 are	 unlikely	 to	 reside	 at	 any	 single	 level	 in	 the	
interoceptive	hierarchy.			In	a	recent	study,	a	comparison	of	autistic	individuals	with	controls	found	
that	 autism	 was	 associated	 with	 (i)	 reduced	 objective	 interoceptive	 sensitivity,	 quantified	 using	
standard	 heartbeat	 detection	 tasks	 and	 (ii)	 an	 increased	 trait	 interoceptive	 sensibility,	 measures	
using	subjective	questionnaires,	as	compared	to	controls	 (86).	 	These	results	can	be	 interpreted	 in	
terms	of	an	 increased	 ‘interoceptive	 trait	prediction	error’	 (ITPE)	 in	autism;	 i.e.,	a	 larger	mismatch	
between	 subjective	 expectations	 about	 interoceptive	 accuracy	 and	 objective	 interoceptive	
sensitivity.	 	 Interestingly,	 across	 both	 autistic	 individuals	 and	 controls,	 the	 magnitude	 of	 ITPE	
correlated	with	 self-reported	anxiety,	 recalling	 the	early	proposal	of	 (87)	which	associated	anxiety	
with	an	interoceptive	prediction	error	(though	not	in		Bayesian	framework).		One	complication	that	
may	nuance	this	view	is	that	autism	often	co-occurs	with	alexithymia	(difficulties	in	identifying	and	
describing	 one’s	 own	 emotions);	 a	 recent	 study	 found	 that	 atypical	 interoception	was	 associated	
with	 alexithymia	 not	 autism,	 though	 this	 study	 did	 not	 specifically	 consider	 ITPEs	 (88).	 	 More	
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generally,	 the	 heterogeneous	 nature	 of	 autism	may	 exclude	 single	 process	 explanations	 and	may	
underlie	 apparently	 inconsistencies	 in	 the	 current	 empirical	 data	 (e.g.,	 another	 recent	 study	 (89)	
found	decreased	not	increased	subjective	body	awareness	in	autism).		
Depression	and	fatigue	
Beyond	 autism,	 interoceptive	 inference	 is	 emerging	 as	 a	 powerful	 framework	 within	 which	 to	
understand	 depression,	 fatigue,	 and	 their	 interactions.	 Depression	 exerts	 a	 profound	 impact	 on	
quality	of	life	and	carries	a	very	high	socio-economic	cost.		Fatigue	is	a	prominent	symptom	across	a	
variety	of	disorders	and	also	exacts	a	high	toll	on	quality	and	productivity	of	life.		While	depression	
and	 fatigue	 encompass	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 cognitive,	 behavioural,	 and	 physiological	 aspects,	 some	
recent	albeit	speculative	proposals	have	implicated	disrupted	interoception	in	their	aetiology.			
In	 one	 version	 of	 this	 story,	 peripheral	 endocrine	 and	 immunological	 changes	 accompanying	 or	
preceding	depressive	onset	 lead	 to	persistently	 imprecise	 (“noisy”)	 interoceptive	afferents	 (9,	 90).	
This	in	turn	leads	to	lower	precision-weighting	of	(i.e.,	reduced	attention	to)	ascending	interoceptive	
signals	 and	 correspondingly	 greater	 reliance	 on	 interoceptive	 priors	 for	 maintaining	 physiological	
homeostasis.	 	 Given	 the	 translation	 of	 interoceptive	 predictions	 into	 homeostatic	 set	 points,	 this	
process	 could	 set	 up	 a	 positive	 feedback	 loop	 in	 which	 greater	 reliance	 on	 prior	 predictions	
generates	 increasingly	 large	and	unreliable	 interoceptive	prediction	errors,	which	 in	 turn	 increases	
the	 reliance	 on	 the	 now	 dysfunctional	 interoceptive	 predictions.	 	 At	 some	 point	 the	 ensuing	
dyshomeostasis	 will	 tip	 over	 into	 fatigue	 and	 sickness	 behaviour	 that	 signal	 the	 initial	 stages	 of	
depression	(9).	
In	 another	 version	 of	 the	 story	 (Stephan	 et	 al.,	 submitted	 for	 publication),	 while	 fatigue	 and	
depression	 are	 still	 considered	 as	 responses	 to	 the	 interoceptive	 experience	 of	 dyshomeostasis,	
these	now	take	the	form	of	metacognitive	beliefs	about	the	brain’s	capacity	to	successfully	regulate	
bodily	 states	 (allostatic	 self-efficacy).	 	 Fatigue	 is	 proposed	 to	 represent	 an	 early	 response	 to	
dyshomeostasis	that	retains	adaptive	value	(like	sickness	behaviours	in	general),	while	a	generalized	
belief	 of	 low	allostatic	 self-efficacy	 following	 prolonged	 (experienced)	 dyshomeostasis	may	 trigger	
depression,	 in	 a	 way	 that	 recalls	 cognitive	 theories	 of	 ‘learned	 helplessness’	 (91).	 	 	 Both	 these	
accounts	of	depression	are	supported	by	the	involvement	of	agranular	visceromotor	cortices	in	the	
pathophysiology	 of	 depression;	 e.g.,	 (92).	 To	 further	 refine,	 distinguish,	 and	 empirically	 test	 these	
formulations	 may	 require	 advanced	 model-based	 neuroimaging	 analyses	 –	 of	 the	 sort	 being	
developed	under	the	rubric	of	‘computational	psychiatry’	(93-95).	
Concluding	remarks	
Applying	 the	 framework	 of	 active	 inference	 to	 interoception	 provides	 a	 powerful	 set	 of	 concepts	
within	which	 to	 conceive	 the	neurofunctional	basis	of	 emotion,	 embodied	 selfhood,	 and	allostatic	
control.	 	 The	main	 points	 can	 be	 summarized	 as	 follows.	 	 Interoceptive	 inference	 parallels	 other	
applications	 of	 active	 inference	 (or	 prediction	 error	minimization)	 in	 proposing	 that	 sensory	 areas	
convey	 ascending	 prediction	 errors	 that	 are	 compared	 with	 descending	 predictions	 across	 a	
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hierarchy	of	 perceptual	 processing.	 For	 interoceptive	 inference,	 predictions	 issue	 from	 (agranular)	
visceromotor	areas	and	project	to	viscerosensory	areas	(to	provide	corollary	feedback)	as	well	as	to	
brainstem	 and	 subcortical	 areas	 (to	 engage	 autonomic	 homeostatic	 reflexes).	 	 Importantly,	
visceromotor	 predictions	 are	 best	 interpreted	 as	 providing	 homeostatic	 set-points	 that	 enslave	
autonomic	reflexes	–	and	guide	allostatic	(behavioural	and	physiological)	responses	via	interoceptive	
prediction	 errors	 at	 different	 hierarchical	 levels	 and	 timescales.	 This	 perspective	 emphasizes	 the	
anticipatory	 control-oriented	 nature	 of	 interoceptive	 inference	 (7),	 recalling	 the	 role	 of	 predictive	
models	 in	cybernetic	theories	of	regulation	(14,	15)	as	well	as	their	counterparts	 in	(exteroceptive)	
perception;	e.g.,	perceptual	control	theory	(18)	(96).	
Mapping	the	computational	architecture	of	interoceptive	inference	to	neuroanatomical	substrates	–		
and	considering	the	key	role	of	precision-weighting	–	provide	the	tools	to	connect	these	ideas	to	(i)	
theories	of	emotion	and	embodied	selfhood	and	their	experimental	manipulation,	and	(ii)	a	range	of	
clinical	conditions	which	express	 interoceptive	symptoms	and/or	plausibly	originate	via	disruptions	
in	interoceptive	inference.	In	terms	of	theoretical	implications,	emotional	feeling	states	can	be	seen	
as	the	joint	content	of	interoceptive	predictions,	while	embodied	selfhood	rests	on	the	multimodal	
and	 amodal	 predictions	 that	 distinguish	 self-related	 from	 non-self	 signals	 via	 active	 inference.	
Accumulating	 clinical	 data	 and	 experimental	 evidence	 are	 revealing	 the	 mechanisms	 by	 which	
interoceptive	 signalling	 shapes	 experiences	 of	 self,	 and	 also	 of	 perceptions	 of	 stimuli	 originating	
from	the	external	environment;	e.g.,	(97)	(98).		However,	uncovering	empirical	evidence	that	speaks	
directly	 in	 favour	 of	 (or	 against)	 interoceptive	 inference	 stands	 as	 an	 important	 challenge.	 	 Key	
predictions	of	the	framework	are	that	(i)	descending	signals	from	VMAs	carry	predictions	about	the	
causes	of	interoceptive	signals	(and,	further,	that	in	doing	so	they	serve	as	homeostatic	set-points);	
(ii)	 ascending	 signals	 targeting	VMAs	 convey	 interoceptive	prediction	errors,	 and	 (iii)	 emotional	or	
affective	 contents	 depend	 primarily	 on	 interoceptive	 predictions	 rather	 than	 prediction	 errors.		
Future	 research	 could	 test	 these	 predictions	 using	 advanced	 laminar	 fMRI	methods	 to	 potentially	
distinguish	‘prediction’	from	‘prediction	error’	responses	(29),	or	by	capitalising	on	natural	variability	
in	physiological	rhythms	(e.g.,	heartbeat	variability)	to	model	ongoing	interoceptive	prediction	errors	
that	 might	 be	 reflected	 in	 electrophysiological	 signals	 [see	 (99)	 for	 a	 promising	 approach].	
Microneurography	 techniques	 –	 which	 allow	 direct	 recording	 of	 peripheral	 nerve	 traffic	 (100)	 –	
might	 also	 provide	 an	 innovative	means	 of	 isolating	 interoceptive	 prediction	 and	 prediction	 error	
signals.		
Extending	active	inference	to	include	autonomic	reflexes	and	interoceptive	predictions	raises	many	
further	 interesting	 questions	 (27).	 For	 example,	 can	 the	 putative	 role	 of	 neuromodulators	 (e.g.,	
dopamine	 and	 oxytocin)	 in	mediating	 the	 precision	 of	 prediction	 errors	 help	 to	 explain	 the	 close	
relationship	 between	 arousal	 and	 anxiety?	 What	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 exteroception	 and	
interoception	 during	 self-observation	 –	 and	 how	 does	 this	 depend	 upon	 the	 attenuation	 of	 the	
precision	of	respective	prediction	errors	(101)?	Do	von	Economo	cells	in	infragranular	cortical	layers	
convey	 interoceptive	 predictions	 from	 the	 insular	 cortex	 to	 the	 amygdala	 and	 other	 subcortical	
targets?	 (102)?	 How	 does	 the	 control-oriented	 nature	 of	 interoceptive	 inference	 shape	 the	
qualitative	aspects	of	interoceptive	experience,	and	what	in	general	determines	the	conscious	status	
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of	 interoceptive	 predictions?	 Key	 questions	 about	 hierarchical	 inference	 and	 the	 role	 of	
interoception	are	also	being	addressed	in	the	new	field	of	neuropsychoanalysis	(103).			
The	practical	 implications	of	 these	 ideas	are	highlighted	by	 their	application	 to	a	variety	of	clinical	
conditions	in	which	atypical	interoceptive	inference	may	play	important	roles	in	aetiology	and/or	in	
symptom	expression.			Emotional	disorders	like	alexithymia	are	relatively	straightforward	to	explain	
in	 terms	of	 atypical	 interoception,	while	more	 complex	and	heterogeneous	 constructs	 like	anxiety	
have	been	considered	 in	 terms	of	 interoceptive	prediction	error	 for	more	 than	a	decade	 (87,	104)	
(105).	 Recent	 developments	 have	 focused	 on	 depression	 and	 fatigue	 as	 emerging	 from	 the	
interoceptive	experience	of	chronic	dyshomeostasis,	whether	directly	or	via	metacognitive	beliefs	in	
inadequate	 allostatic	 self-efficacy	 (Stephan	et	 al,	 submitted).	 	 	 Autism,	 also	highly	 heterogeneous,	
seems	 to	 have	 a	 common	 interoceptive	 foundation;	 possibly	 with	 a	 developmental	 origin	 and	
symptom	 expression	 characterized	 by	 discrepancies	 between	 (reduced)	 objective	 interoceptive	
sensitivity	 and	 (enhanced)	 self-appraisal	 of	 interoceptive	 ability.	 	 Importantly,	 the	 involvement	 of	
interoceptive	 inference	 in	 these	 and	 other	 conditions	 –	 including,	 for	 instance,	 depersonalisation	
disorder,	 see	 (106)	 –	 opens	 new	 avenues	 for	 diagnosis	 through	 physiological	 measures	 and	
computational	 psychiatry	 approaches,	 and	 potential	 clinical	 intervention	 via	 interoceptive	 training	
and	feedback.		
Altogether,	considering	embodied	selfhood	through	the	lens	of	prediction	error	minimization	brings	
a	 new	 way	 to	 think	 about	 an	 old	 doctrine.	 	 Rene	 Descartes,	 besides	 dividing	 the	 world	 into	 res	
cogitans	and	res	extensa,	also	achieved	a	certain	notoriety	for	introducing	the	doctrine	of	the	‘beast	
machine’	(ca.	1694).	He	argued	that	while	humans	had	minds	directing	their	behaviour,	non-human	
animals	 (‘brutes’)	 were	 nothing	 more	 than	 unthinking,	 unfeeling	 machines	 that	 breathe,	 digest,	
perceive	and	move	‘like	clockwork’.	Now	that	we	can	see	how	human	minds	are	deeply	grounded	in	
embodied	physiology,	and	that	similar	functional	principles	may	unite	physiological	regulation	with	
perception	 of	 the	 external	 world	 and	 the	 guidance	 of	 actions	 and	 behaviour,	 an	 inversion	 of	
Descartes’	doctrine	seems	plausible:	that	our	subjective	experiences	of	selfhood	may	arise	because	
of,	and	not	in	spite	of,	the	fact	that	we	too	are	‘beast	machines’.	
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